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Difficulties with Sharing: A Proposal to Define the
Voluntary Unit and Protect the Rights of Surface CoOwners and Mineral Servitude Holders in Louisiana
INTRODUCTION
“It’s always more fun to share with everyone.”1 This sentiment,
although nice in a children’s song, does not always hold true in the
real world. Because co-ownership is frequently inconvenient,
Louisiana avoids friction between co-owners by allowing them to
divide the co-owned thing into separately owned portions or sell
the thing and divide the proceeds.2 However, these options to
partition the co-owned thing may not always be ideal or available,
such as when the co-owned thing is burdened by a separately
owned right that cannot be partitioned.3 Accordingly, difficulties
with sharing may leave squabbling co-owners without a suitable
remedy and potentially clueless as to their rights as co-owners.
Consider the following co-ownership scenario in a mineral law
context.
On January 1, 1997, Farmer Joe created a mineral servitude by
selling the mineral rights on his 1,000-acre tract of land in DeSoto
Parish to Big City Bob.4 This mineral servitude vests Bob with the
right to explore for minerals on the burdened land.5 Bob’s
servitude will expire, and his mineral rights will revert back to Joe,
if Bob does not use the servitude within ten years of its creation.6
Copyright 2014, by W. DREW BURNHAM.
1. JACK JOHNSON, The Sharing Song, on SING-A-LONGS AND LULLABIES
FOR THE FILM CURIOUS GEORGE (Brushfire Records 2006).
2. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 807 (2012).
3. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:65 (2000); LA. CIV. CODE art. 747
(2012) (discussing servitudes in general); see infra Part I.C.
4. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:16 (2000); see also Frost-Johnson
Lumber Co. v. Salling’s Heirs, 91 So. 207, 245 (La. 1922).
5. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:21 (2000) (“A mineral servitude is the
right of enjoyment of land belonging to another for the purpose of exploring for
and producing minerals and reducing them to possession and ownership.”).
6. See id. § 31:27(1) (listing “prescription resulting from nonuse for ten
years” as a method of extinguishing a mineral servitude); see also id. § 31:29
(“The prescription of nonuse running against a mineral servitude is interrupted
by good faith operations for the discovery and production of minerals.”); id. §
31:29 cmt. (noting that dry holes may constitute good faith operations); id. §
31:44 (stating that the adoption of operations by another may interrupt
prescription); id. § 31:33 (defining unit operations that can affect prescription on
the servitude); id. § 31:36 (stating that production on the tract will interrupt
prescription on the servitude); id. § 31:54 (declaring that a proper
acknowledgment will interrupt prescription on a servitude).
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Farmer Joe passes away in 1999, leaving his ten children in
equal co-ownership of the tract of land burdened by Bob’s
servitude.7 One of those children, Mike, purchases all but one of
his siblings’ interests in the property, leaving his sister, Kate, as a
co-owner of 10% of the property.8 In 2006, an oil and gas
prospector, Black Gold Drilling, enters the picture. Wanting to
exploit the up-and-coming Haynesville Shale in northwest
Louisiana quickly and cheaply, Black Gold seeks to form a
voluntary unit that would include Mike’s interests. Such a unit is a
contractual agreement by which a group of mineral rights owners,
land owners, and other parties agree to participate in the costs and
revenue of mineral exploration in a defined area.9
Bob, the mineral servitude owner, and Mike, the 90% co-owner
of the surface, sign onto the voluntary unit. Bob sees his
involvement in the voluntary unit as an opportunity to share in
revenue, interrupt the running of prescription against his servitude,
and avoid the expense of drilling individually on his servitude
tract. Mike sees the voluntary unitization as an opportunity to
receive some compensation for his consent.10 If Mike did not
consent, Bob may individually drill on his servitude, in which case
Mike would not recover any compensation and would go through
the inconvenience of having a well drilled on the surface of his
property. On the other hand, Kate, the 10% owner of the surface,
thinks that prescription will fully accrue against Bob’s servitude
before any drilling occurs that would interrupt prescription; thus,
Kate refuses to consent to the voluntary unit, expecting that the
mineral rights will revert back to her surface ownership.11
In December 2006, Black Gold, as the operator of the
voluntary unit, drills a producing well on land outside the surface
7. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 880 (2012).
8. See id.
9. Patrick S. Ottinger, Conventional Unitization in Louisiana, 49 ANN.
INST. ON MIN. L. 21, 23 (2002) [hereinafter Ottinger, Conventional Unitization]
(“Unitization is the allocation of designated acreage to a well for purposes of
development, cost-sharing and allocation of production.”). As opposed to
compulsory unitization, conventional unitization is a contractual pooling of
ownership rights in a defined area for purposes of production in that area. Id. at
42. A unit agreement is a contract agreed to between the consenting parties to be
affected by the unitization and the agreement forms a voluntary unit. Id. at 42–
45.
10. Id.
11. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:65 (2000). As a co-owner, Kate may
partition the land that she co-owns with Mike, but such a partition will not affect
the servitude burdening her property. The servitude will remain intact. See infra
Part I.C.
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owned by Kate and Mike but within the unit area.12 As a result of
such drilling, prescription running on a mineral right in the unit
will generally be interrupted.13 The prescription that accrued
against Bob’s servitude since 1997 appears to be interrupted by
Black Gold’s drilling.14 However, on January 2, 2007, Kate claims
that Bob’s servitude has expired, and that the mineral rights have
reverted back to the surface owners. Kate asserts that unit
production did not interrupt prescription on Bob’s mineral
servitude because her consent to the voluntary unit agreement was
necessary for the unit to have affected her interests.15
Neither the Mineral Code nor Louisiana jurisprudence furnishes
a definitive answer to the question of whether prescription is
interrupted and, if so, to what extent prescription is interrupted on
the non-drill site tract by a voluntary unit to which the surface coowner did not consent. This gap poses significant problems for oil
and gas operators, surface co-owners, and owners of mineral rights.
Uncertainty surrounding the formation and effect of voluntary units
makes this relatively cheap and quick method of unitization too
unpredictable for widespread use by operators, causing them to opt
for the more expensive and time-consuming process of seeking a
compulsory unitization.16 Misunderstandings of how non-consenting
surface co-owners are affected by voluntary unitizations may
produce flaws in chains of title regarding mineral rights and leases.
12. Production from a unit well on a tract burdened by a servitude will
cause prescription accruing against the servitude to be interrupted. See LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 31:37 (2000). If the well is off-tract, the prescription will only
occur for that portion of the burdened land that is included in the unit. Id. The
same rule exists for mineral royalties. Id. § 31:89. For exceptions to this general
rule, see discussion infra Part I.D.
13. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:37 (2000); id. § 31:89.
14. See id. § 31:29.
15. See Alexander v. Holt, 116 So. 2d 532, 536–37 (La. Ct. App. 1959)
(stating that inclusion of servitude acreage in a conventional unitization by the
servitude owners was not effective to interrupt prescription without landowner
consent because the servitude owner was powerless to extend the life of the
servitude without the clear consent of the landowner burdened by the servitude);
see also John M. McCollam, A Primer for the Practice of Mineral Law Under
the New Louisiana Mineral Code, 50 TUL. L. REV. 732, 775 (1976).
16. Ottinger, Conventional Unitization, supra note 9, at 25–26. Compulsory
unitization is accomplished through applications to, hearings with, and a
favorable order from the Louisiana Office of Conservation. Even if “fast
tracked” to avoid imminent lease expirations and mineral right prescription, this
process takes no less than 70 days. Id. at 25 n.23. Significant costs are associated
with preparing and filing applications for compulsory unit orders with the Office
of Conservation, costs that may be substantially less if a conventional unit route
is selected. Id. at 26.
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These flaws will vitiate the consent of those who mistakenly
appeared to possess mineral rights and potentially cause millions
of dollars of investment in unit development, production payments,
and lease acquisition to be wasted. Additionally, surface co-owners
may be entitled to a reversion of the mineral rights previously held
in servitudes or royalties back to their ownership.
From a synthesis of relevant Louisiana Civil Code and Mineral
Code articles, three principal remedial options appear to be
available to a court facing this scenario. First, the court could rule
that the voluntary unitization does not affect those who do not
consent to it, and thus, the servitude is not interrupted to any extent.
Second, the court could conclude, using a principle found in
conducting operations on mineral servitudes and leases, that a
substantial majority of surface co-owners may encumber the surface
through a voluntary unit without the consent of the minority coowners. Third, the court could find that the most equitable solution
is to proportionally prescribe the servitude interests to the
percentage of surface co-owner consent obtained to the voluntary
unitization. However, these solutions are neither equitable between
the parties nor clearly consistent with existing Louisiana law.17
Accordingly, amendments to the Mineral Code are necessary to
define the voluntary unit and dictate how a non-consenting coowner is affected by a voluntary unitization that lacked his or her
consent.18 These necessary changes are needed quickly so as to
avoid unnecessary waste and delay in mineral development and to
incentivize exploration through the use of the relatively cheap and
speedy alternative to compulsory unitsvoluntary units.
This Comment proposes a solution to the pressing question of
whether a surface co-owner can be burdened by a voluntary
unitization to which he or she did not consent. Part I gives a brief
explanation of how mineral rights are formed in Louisiana, the
nature of the mineral servitude, co-ownership principles, and unit
formation. Part II explores three potential remedies derived from
existing law that a court may apply to the issue presented. Part III
proposes two revisions to the Mineral Code—clear definitions of
the voluntary unit and its effects. If adopted, these modest
clarifications of existing law would ensure the ideal outcome to the
current issue: a solution that provides an equitable remedy for
surface co-owners, mineral servitude holders, and oil and gas
operators alike.
17. See discussion infra Part II.
18. See discussion infra Part III.
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I. FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF LOUISIANA MINERAL AND COOWNERSHIP LAW
Several tenets of Louisiana mineral law and principles of coownership interconnect to lead to the current ambiguity of whether
drilling from a voluntary unit can interrupt prescription accruing
against a servitude that burdens a non-consenting surface coowner’s tract. These interrelated principles include the nature of
mineral servitudes, co-ownership, and unitization.
A. The Separation of Mineral Rights from the Land
Louisiana adopts a non-ownership theory regarding subsurface
migratory, or non-solid, minerals.19 This means that the oil and gas
that may be below the surface of an owner’s land is not owned
until extracted and possessed.20 In the foundational case of FrostJohnson Lumber Co. v. Salling’s Heirs, the Louisiana Supreme
Court found that there is no ownership of minerals until those
minerals are removed from the ground and physically possessed.21
This result was later codified in the Louisiana Mineral Code.22
Rather than retain ownership before possession, the landowner is
vested only with the right to explore for and extract migratory
minerals, like oil and gas.23
The landowner may separate this right of mineral exploration
from the land in whole or in part.24 The fundamental mineral rights
created by landowners in Louisiana are the mineral servitude,25

19. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
AND GAS LAW § 216.1 (2012).
20. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN.

31:6 (2000); 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL

§ 31:6 (2000); see, e.g., Frost-Johnson
Lumber Co. v. Salling’s Heirs, 91 So. 207, 245 (La. 1922) (“We may hold, and
we do hold, that no matter what the intention of the parties be, the owner of
lands cannot convey or reserve the ownership of the oils, gases, and waters
therein apart from the land in which they lie; and we so hold, because the owner
himself has no absolute property in such oils, gases, and waters, but only the
right to draw them through the soil and thereby become the owner of them.”).
21. Frost-Johnson, 91 So. at 243.
22. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:6–7 (2000).
23. See Id. § 31:8; Frost-Johnson, 91 So. at 243. Mineral rights are real
rights. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:16 (2000).
24. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:15 (2000).
25. See id. § 31:21 (“A mineral servitude is the right of enjoyment of land
belonging to another for the purpose of exploring for and producing minerals
and reducing them to possession and ownership.”).
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mineral royalty,26 and mineral lease.27 Louisiana’s civilian tradition
dictates that the sale of the right to explore for minerals does not
create a permanent separation of the mineral right from the land like
in the case of the mineral estate in common law jurisdictions but,
rather, a real right that burdens a tract of land unless left unused for
a certain period.28 This Comment focuses on the mineral servitude.
B. The Mineral Servitude
“A mineral servitude is the right of enjoyment of land
belonging to another for the purpose of exploring for and
producing minerals and reducing them to possession and
ownership.”29 The mineral servitude exists as a burden upon the
land from which it is derived.30 Though functioning in a manner
similar to a predial servitude,31 the mineral servitude is best
categorized as a limited personal servitude.32 The mineral servitude
may be granted only by the landowner who possesses the right to
explore for and produce minerals at the time of the mineral
servitude’s creation.33 The rights of the servitude owner may be
contractually limited or subjected to more onerous requirements
26. See id. § 31:80 (“A mineral royalty is the right to participate in
production of minerals from land owned by another or land subject to a mineral
servitude owned by another.”).
27. See id. § 31:114 (“A mineral lease is a contract by which the lessee is
granted the right to explore for and produce minerals.”).
28. Id. § 31:16. See Wemple v. Nabors Oil & Gas Co., 97 So. 666, 667–69
(La. 1923) (“[W]e therefore conclude that there is in this state no such estate in
lands as a corporeal ‘mineral estate,’ distinct from and independent of the
surface estate; that the so-called ‘mineral estate’ by whatever term described, or
however, acquired or reserved, is a mere servitude upon the land in which the
minerals lie, giving only the right to extract such minerals and appropriate
them.”).
29. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:21 (2000).
30. Patrick S. Ottinger, A Primer on the Mineral Servitude, 44 ANN. INST.
ON MIN. L. 68, 75 (1997) [hereinafter Ottinger, The Mineral Servitude] (quoting
Steele v. Denning, 456 So. 2d 992, 998 (La. 1984)).
31. The mineral servitude is theoretically distinct from the predial servitude
in that there is no dominant estate in the case of the mineral servitude, only a
servient one. See A. N. YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES § 1:9, in 4
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (4th ed. 2013).
32. Luther L. McDougal III, Louisiana Mineral Servitudes, 61 TUL. L. REV.
1097, 1099 (1987).
33. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:24 (2000); McDougal, supra note 32, at
1101; Ottinger, The Mineral Servitude, supra note 30, at 77–78. If the right of
the landowner is conditional or subject to resolution, the servitude created by
that landowner will expire concurrently with the right of the landowner to create
the servitude. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:25 (2000).
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for prescription interruption, but the contractual terms may not
circumvent the minimum standards provided by law.34
A mineral servitude can be extinguished in many ways: by the
prescription of nonuse of ten years,35 confusion,36 renunciation of
the servitude,37 expiration of the time contractually granted for the
existence of the servitude,38 occurrence of a dissolving condition
imposed upon the servitude,39 or extinction of the right of the
grantor of the servitude.40 The prescription of nonuse is the most
relevant for the current analysis because, as seen in the
hypothetical, the issue posed by Kate’s non-consent to the
voluntary unit is whether Black Gold’s drilling upon the unit will
constitute a use that interrupts the prescription accruing against
Bob’s servitude.
The prescription of nonuse for mineral servitudes is derived
from the civilian concept that real rights other than ownership are
subject to the prescription of nonuse.41 The Mineral Code states
that these mineral rights are subject to a prescriptive period of ten
years.42 Prescription begins to accrue on the day that the servitude is
created.43 Thus, a mineral servitude will terminate after ten years of
nonuse by the servitude holder; however, this accrual of prescription

34. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:74–75 (2000) (“The rules of use
regarding interruption of prescription on a mineral servitude may be restricted
by agreement but may not be made less burdensome, except that parties may
agree expressly and in writing, either in the act creating a servitude or otherwise,
that an interruption of prescription resulting from unit operations or production
shall extend to the entirety of the tract burdened by the servitude tract regardless
of the location of the well or of whether all or only part of the tract is included in
the unit.”); see also McDougal, supra note 32, at 1114.
35. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:27(1) (2000).
36. See id. § 31:27(2). For a functionally similar provision, see La. CIV.
CODE art. 765 (2012) (“A predial servitude is extinguished when the dominant
and the servient estates are acquired in their entirety by the same person.”).
However, the owner of land can be a co-owner of a mineral servitude burdening
his property without causing “confusion.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:66–67
(2000). See generally Allied Chem. Corp. v. Dye, 441 So. 2d 776 (La. Ct. App.
1983); Patrick H. Martin, Mineral Rights, Developments in the Law, 1983-84, 45
LA. L. REV. 433, 442 (1984).
37. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:27(3) (2000); see generally Harmon v.
Whitten, 390 So. 2d 962 (La. Ct. App. 1980).
38. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:27(4) (2000).
39. Id.
40. Id. § 31:27(5).
41. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3448 (2012).
42. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:27(1) (2000).
43. Id. § 31:28.
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may be interrupted44 or suspended.45 Additionally, a mineral
servitude may also be extended by the landowner’s consent.46
This Comment primarily concerns two similar methods of
interruption: good faith drilling and production. Good faith drilling
is an exploratory operation that does not result in the production of
minerals but constitutes a genuine effort to do so.47 Drilling that
leads to the production of minerals also interrupts prescription
accruing against a servitude.48 Good faith drilling or production in a
conventional or compulsory unit49 whose unit area overlaps with the
land burdened by a servitude also interrupts prescription accruing
against that servitude.50 If the unit well is off-tract (i.e., the location
of drilling is not positioned on the tract of the burdened
landowner), prescription will be interrupted only for the portion of
the servitude encompassed within the unit area.51 If the unit well is
44. See id. §§ 31:29–57. An interruption causes the time that has accrued to
be erased and time begins to accrue anew upon the end of the interrupting event
or condition. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3466 (2012).
45. A suspension is a period of time where the servitude cannot be used.
Prescriptive time does not accrue against the servitude during the period, but the
time already accrued against the servitude prior to the suspensive condition is
not erased by the suspending event. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:58–61
(2000); LA. CIV. CODE art. 3472 (2012); see also Louviere v. Shell Oil Co., 440
So. 2d 93, 97 n.8 (La. 1983) (“The basic difference between interruption and
suspension of prescription is the length of the prescriptive period when
prescription begins to run anew.”).
46. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:56 (2000). An extension occurs when a
landowner expressly, in a writing filed for registry, extends the life of the
servitude beyond the servitude date for a defined period. McDougal, supra note
32, at 1156–57. This defined period logically must be less than the period that
would result from an interruption, as law prevents a prescriptive period longer than
ten years, and a ten-year “extension” would function as an acknowledgement. Id.
47. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:29 (2000) (“The prescription of nonuse
running against a mineral servitude is interrupted by good faith operations for
the discovery and production of minerals. By good faith is meant that the
operations must be (1) commenced with reasonable expectation of discovering
and producing minerals in paying quantities at a particular point or depth, (2)
continued at the site chosen to that point or depth, and (3) conducted in such a
manner that they constitute a single operation although actual drilling or mining
is not conducted at all times.”). For a discussion on “good faith drilling,” see
Indigo Minerals, LLC v. Pardee Minerals, LLC, 37 So. 3d 1122, 1129–31 (La.
Ct. App. 2010), and Bass Enterprises Production Co. v. Kiene, 437 So. 2d 940
(La. Ct. App. 1983).
48. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:36 (2000).
49. See infra Part I.D.
50. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:33 (2000).
51. Id. §§ 31:33–37. One instance of a limited opportunity for “freedom of
contract” may occur when the landowner and the servitude owner contract for an
interruption to the portion of the servitude outside the unit area. See LA. REV.
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on the tract burdened by the servitude, interruption occurs for the
whole of the servitude, regardless of whether a portion of the
servitude tract is outside the unit area.52
The running of prescription of nonuse may also be interrupted by
acknowledgment.53 Acknowledgment occurs when the landowner of
the tract burdened by the servitude makes clear in writing that he or
she intends to interrupt the running of prescription of the servitude
for the party owning the servitude.54 To affect third parties, the
acknowledgment must be filed for registry.55 The requirement that the
landowner make the acknowledgment is a necessary consequence of
the fact that only the landowner may burden the thing owned.56 The
acknowledgment is an extension of the life of the servitude without
the owner of the servitude engaging in activity that would constitute
a “use” of the servitude.57 However, obtaining the consent of surface
owners to further encumber the land by means of an
acknowledgement is complicated when the surface is owned in
indivision, i.e., co-ownership.58
C. Co-ownership
Ownership of one thing by more than one person is ownership in
indivision, also known as co-ownership.59 Land, as well as mineral
rights,60 is susceptible of ownership in indivision.61 Though each
co-owner possesses the right to use the co-owned thing,62 the

STAT. ANN. § 31:75 (2000); Ottinger, Conventional Unitization, supra note 9, at
53–54 (2002); see also Sandefer & Andress, Inc. v. Pruitt, 471 So. 2d 933, 937
(La. Ct. App. 1985).
52. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:33–37 (2000).
53. See id. § 31:54.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id. § 31:54 cmt.
57. See id. § 31:54.
58. See discussion infra Part I.C.
59. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 797 (2012).
60. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:168 (2000).
61. See Patrick S. Ottinger, “Oil in the Family”: Obtaining the Requisite
Consent to Conduct Operations on Co-Owned Land or Mineral Servitudes, 73
LA. L. REV. 745, 747 (2012) [hereinafter Ottinger, Oil in the Family].
62. Each co-owner has the right to use the thing consistent with the
“destination” of the property. LA. CIV. CODE art. 802 (2012). As applied to land,
the term “destination” references the kind of uses of the land that landowners
historically practice. Thomas A. Harrell, Problems Created by Coownership in
Louisiana, 32 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 379, 386 n.13 (1985).
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consent of all of the co-owners is required to alienate or encumber
the entire co-owned thing.63
Louisiana co-ownership law is rooted in the civilian tradition.64
“Roman law recognized the concept of co-ownership as each coowner ‘possessing an abstract portion of the whole,’ or a portion of
‘each molecule’ of the property held in common.”65 Because this
joint ownership is of each and every part of the thing co-owned,
the co-owner has a distinct right to participate in decisions
regarding the encumbrance of that thing.66 The drafters of the
Louisiana Civil Code adopted this principle, which can be
distinctly seen in the creation of predial servitudes,67 and also in its
close relative, the mineral servitude.68
When conflicts arise between co-owners, the legally prescribed
remedy is partition.69 Partition is the division of a co-owned thing
into separate, independent things or the sale of the co-owned thing
and division of the sale proceeds to the former co-owners.70 “The
need to partition stems from the inconvenience of co-management,
namely the requirement of unanimous consent . . . .”71 Partition is

63. LA. CIV. CODE art. 805 (2012). Granting a mineral lease upon co-owned
land or servitude is possible, but a lessee of certain co-owners may not drill
upon the property without obtaining consent of co-owners with at least 80% of
ownership in the co-owned thing. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:166 (2000).
64. See Angela Jeanne Crowder, Mineral Rights: The Requirement of
Consent Among Co-Owners, 48 LA. L. REV. 931, 931–33 (1988).
65. Id. at 931. See also George Denègre, Comment, Ownership in Indivision
in Louisiana, 22 TUL. L. REV. 611, 611 (1948). The rule in the Louisiana Civil
Code requiring the consent of all co-owners to encumber the property is derived
from the works of Roman commentators. See Crowder, supra note 64, at 931–
33. The rule represents a long-held policy in civil jurisdictions that the rights of
one co-owner in a thing may not be adversely affected by the unilateral acts of
another co-owner. See Gulf Refining Co. of La. v. Carroll, 82 So. 277, 278 (La.
1919).
66. See Crowder, supra note 64.
67. LA. CIV. CODE art. 714 (2012) (“A predial servitude on an estate owned
in indivision may be established only with the consent of all the co-owners.
When a co-owner purports to establish a servitude on the entire estate, the
contract is not null; but, its execution is suspended until the consent of all coowners is obtained.”).
68. Crowder, supra note 64, at 932.
69. LA. CIV. CODE art. 807 (2012) (“No one may be compelled to hold a
thing in indivision with another unless the contrary has been provided by law or
juridical act. Any co-owner has a right to demand partition of a thing held in
indivision.”).
70. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 810–11 (2012).
71. Campbell v. Pasternack Holding Co., 625 So. 2d 477, 480 (La. 1993).
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said to be a “favored” remedy by courts in Louisiana.72 Referencing
the earlier hypothetical of siblings Mike and Kate, it would seem
that the minority surface co-owner, Kate, could partition the land
and avoid complications with the voluntary unit and the mineral
servitude burdening her land. However, a partition accomplished
between co-owners of land burdened by a mineral right, including a
mineral servitude, will not divide the mineral right—a consequence
of legal protections afforded third parties to the co-ownership.73
Accordingly, in the hypothetical, the land owned in indivision may
be partitioned between Mike and Kate, but the mineral servitude
held by Bob could not be divided and the problem of whether
Kate’s consent to the voluntary unit is necessary for the unit to
affect her rights would remain unresolved.
Prior to the adoption of the Mineral Code, the Louisiana Civil
Code governed co-owner delegations of mineral rights.74 Louisiana
courts consistently applied the rule that universal co-owner consent
was necessary to encumber land or mineral rights subject in its
entirety to co-ownership.75 The Mineral Code initially maintained
the universal co-owner consent rule.76 However, in 1986, the
general principle of universal co-owner consent was excepted,
making full consent among land co-owners unnecessary in certain
circumstances.77
In 1986, the Louisiana Legislature amended the Mineral Code
so that a small minority of co-owners of land or of a mineral
servitude could not prevent the development of land for mineral
production.78 Because exploration required the full consent of the
co-owners, the former system allowed a small minority of co-owners
72. Ottinger, Oil in the Family, supra note 61, at 752 (quoting Pasternack
Holding, 625 So. 2d at 480).
73. Cf. LA. CIV. CODE art. 747 (2012) (discussing division of a dominate
estate subject to a servitude); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:65 (2000) (“The
division of a tract burdened by a mineral servitude does not divide the
servitude.”); see generally Andrew L. Gates, III, Partition of Land and Mineral
Rights, 43 LA. L. REV. 1119, 1132–41 (1983).
74. Crowder, supra note 64, at 932.
75. See Superior Oil Producing Co. v. Leckelt, 181 So. 462, 467 (La. 1938)
(stating that mineral servitudes granted by less than all of the co-owners would
not be null, but simply suspended until all consent is obtained. Though the
servitude owner was not able to explore for and develop the land for production
activities because of the lack of full consent, the servitude was still a valid
mineral servitude); Gulf Refining Co. of La. v. Carroll, 82 So. 277 (La. 1919);
see also Ottinger, Oil in the Family, supra note 61, at 749.
76. Ottinger, Oil in the Family, supra note 61, at 762.
77. Id. at 761–64.
78. Act No. 1047, 1986 La. Acts 1964.
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to force lessees of the majority of co-owners into disproportionately
advantageous deals for the minority by withholding consent.79 This
“shakedown” would seem to be the natural result of giving a coowner or a group of co-owners with a relatively small interest the
ability to prevent exploitation of mineral rights without their consent.
In a move inconsistent with civilian co-ownership principles,80 the
revisions made by the Legislature to the Mineral Code in 1986
enable co-owners of land to grant servitudes that could be exercised
with only the consent of 90% of the co-owners.81 The 90% consent
threshold was lowered to 80% in 1988.82 It was left unclear whether
the new lower level of co-owner consent to the creation of
servitudes would affect the formation and effects of unitization
agreements—agreements that may affect both consenting and nonconsenting co-owners alike.83
D. Unitization
Unitization pools ownership interests in a defined area in order
to encourage oil and gas development by the sharing of costs and
the equitable division of production proceeds between the
assembled acreage.84 There are two categories of unitization:
compulsory and conventional.85 In Louisiana, the Commissioner of
Conservation of the Department of Natural Resources is tasked
with avoiding the waste of minerals and the drilling of unnecessary
wells.86 To accomplish this end, the Commissioner may form
compulsory units to pool the interests of land and mineral right
owners in a defined geographic area.87 Compulsory units are
typically granted through application and hearing processes that
will likely be more expensive and time consuming than would be
conventional unitization processes.88
79. See Ottinger, Oil in the Family, supra note 61, at 753.
80. Crowder, supra note 64, at 933.
81. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:164 cmt. (2000). The same principle was
applied for granting mineral leases by co-owners of servitudes, id. § 31:166, and
land, id. § 31:175.
82. Act No. 647, 1988 La. Acts 1686.
83. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:164 cmt. (2000).
84. See Ottinger, Conventional Unitization, supra note 9, at 23.
85. Id. at 28.
86. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:9(B) (2000) (stating that the drilling unit is
“the maximum area which may be efficiently and economically drained by one
well”).
87. See id. § 31:213(6).
88. Ottinger, Conventional Unitization, supra note 9, at 25–26.
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Alternatively, a simple contract may form a conventional unit
without government mandate.89 Declared units and voluntary units
are the two types of conventional units.90 A declared unit is derived
from a mineral lease and is “declared unilaterally by the lessee
under the terms of a pooling clause contained in an oil and gas
lease that does not require the further consent of the lessor to the
creation of [the] unit.”91 Without prior authorization from a
landowner to his or her lessee to pool the granted mineral interest
with other interests, the lessee seeking a conventional unit must
turn to the voluntary unit.92 The voluntary unit is “created by the
bilateral execution of a unit agreement by all parties in interest,
including the landowner-lessor.”93 Voluntary unit agreements
(VUAs) create units through contract that give only the
contractually bound parties the right to participate in production
and are only effective against those persons who are parties to the
contract.94
As compulsory units are formed by the Commissioner and
declared units are formed through existing lease clauses, the
voluntary unit is the only type of unitization that will lead to the
scenario that this Comment addresseswhere consent to pool
interests has not previously been acquired.95 An operator seeking
to drill in an area may choose to seek a voluntary unit rather than a
compulsory unit in order to avoid excessive costs associated with
forming a compulsory unit through the Commissioner of

89. Id. at 24.
90. Id.
91. McCollam, supra note 15, at 773 n.296. A declared unit may only be
created where each joining lessee can create a valid unit through authorization in
their lease. See id. at 776; see also Union Oil Co. v. Touchet, 86 So. 2d 50, 54
(La. 1956).
92. Ottinger, Conventional Unitization, supra note 9, at 26–27.
93. McCollam, supra note 15, at 773 n.297. All VUAs, as contractually
derived regimes, are not effective against the interests of non-consenting
burdened landowners, as the mineral right holder cannot unilaterally decrease
the “use” burden required by the Mineral Code. See id. at 775.
94. Ottinger, Conventional Unitization, supra note 9, at 43. See discussion
infra Part I.E.
95. Compulsory unitizations are effective upon all interests that are found
within the defined unit area as a function of the state’s police power. McCollam,
supra note 15, at 775. Declared units are created with the consent of the grantorlandowner through a defined power explicitly conferred in the mineral lease. Id.
at 773 n.296. A declared unit may only be created where each joining lessee can
create a valid unit through authorization in their lease. See id. at 775; see also
Touchet, 86 So. 2d at 50.
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Conservation.96 Or, because the application process for a
compulsory unit can be time consuming, an operator may seek a
voluntary unit to quickly unitize mineral interests to avoid
prescription accruing against them.97 The creation of voluntary
units raises the question of whether such a contractual arrangement
can affect the interests of an apparent third party.98 A nonconsenting surface co-owner, like our hypothetical Kate, is such a
third party to the contract who would be “affected” by the contract
if the voluntary unit interrupted prescription running against a
servitude burdening the co-owned land, like Bob’s servitude.
E. The Necessity of a Surface Owner’s Consent for Voluntary
Units
The Louisiana Mineral Code does not speak to the process of
voluntary unit formation. Comments to the Mineral Code state that
conventional units, declared and voluntary units, are formed
through the consent of those parties affected.99 It does not
determine who is an affected party. The Mineral Code fails to
address whether surface owner consent to the unit is necessary for
a voluntary unit to affect the interests of that surface owner. The
effects relative to an individual mineral right, including a mineral
servitude, that result from a voluntary unitization depend upon two
primary concerns: the location of the unit well and the extent to
which the tract burdened by the mineral right is included within the
unit area.100 The interruption of prescription that can result from
the drilling of a well on a voluntary unit occurs for those mineral
rights whose owners have consented to the VUA.101 Any
interruption that results from drilling through a voluntary unit also
affects landowners whose tracts are burdened by those mineral
rights, as it ensures the mineral rights of those landowners do not
revert back to them for at least a new ten-year period.102
The comments to article 213 of the Mineral Code state that
conventional units are formed “by a contract executed by all
96. The costs which may add up to burdensome levels are found in the
geological and title research, application fees, profession fees, and more that are
not as significant or not necessary in order to form a conventional unit. See
Ottinger, Conventional Unitization, supra note 9, at 24–26, 42.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 42–43.
99. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:213 cmt. (2000).
100. See discussion supra Part I.B.
101. See discussion supra Part I.D.
102. See discussion supra Part I.B.
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parties affected, or otherwise.”103 Landowners burdened by a
mineral servitude can certainly be considered “parties affected” by
the VUA, as off-tract production would interrupt the running of
prescription for any portion of their land encompassed within the
unit.104 Thus, the comments to the article may suggest that
landowner consent is necessary.105 However, comments are not
law.106 If the comments are read to make landowner consent
necessary, it is an ill-defined statement when read in isolation, as
the comments fail to define what an “affect” is that would
necessitate the involvement of the “affected” party in the formation
of the unit. Thankfully, general contract law principles, preMineral Code jurisprudence, and scholarly research support the
view that voluntary unitizations require surface owner consent in
order to affect those parties.
Principles of Louisiana contract law show that if the
landowners do not consent to the VUA, then they should not be
bound by the contract. A VUA is only formed through contractual
agreement between various “affected parties.”107 These contracts
are agreements between two or more parties through which
obligations are created.108 Contracts serve as law for the parties109
but only produce effects for third parties when provided by law.110
There is no law that enables voluntary units to burden the
ownership interests of third parties. Therefore, voluntary units
must not affect non-signatories to the VUA.
In Eads Operating Co. v. Thompson, the Louisiana First Circuit
Court of Appeals discussed conventional unitization, reciting that
“[i]t was a necessary prerequisite . . . to the creation of such a unit
that all interested landowners and leaseowners join in the unit
agreement”111 and that creation of “such a unit . . . required

103. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:213 cmt. (2000).
104. See Ottinger, The Mineral Servitude, supra note 30, at 129.
105. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:213 cmt. (2000).
106. See, e.g., Arabie v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 89 So. 3d 307, 312 (La.
2012) (“While the Official Revision Comments are not the law, they may be
helpful in determining legislative intent.”).
107. Id.
108. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1906 (2012).
109. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1983 (2012).
110. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1985 (2012).
111. Eads Operating Co. v. Thompson, 646 So. 2d 948, 953 (La. Ct. App.
1994) (quoting Thomas M. Winfiele, New Legislation Relating to the
Conservation Department, 8 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 9, 10 (1961)).
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voluntary agreement by all interested parties.”112 To paraphrase,
the court declared that “interested parties,” like surface owners, are
unaffected by a voluntary unit unless they consent to be bound by
the contract.113 Pre-Mineral Code jurisprudence sheds light on
which parties are “interested” with respect to a VUA.114
In Alexander v. Holt, the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a mineral servitude holder was without the right
to affect the prescription running against his servitude by entering
into a VUA without also obtaining the consent of the landowner.115
The court indicated that, otherwise, the VUA would serve as a
mechanism for interruption outside those given to the mineral
servitude owner by contract or law.116 Servitude owners “are
powerless to extend their mineral rights without the consent of the
landowners who, under the law, must clearly and definitely state or
act in such a way so as to show that it was their intention to
interrupt the running of prescription and start it anew.”117 This case
makes clear that, without further consent from the landowner, the
mineral servitude holder cannot extend his or her own rights
beyond those given to the holder by the servitude and by law.118
The Mineral Code dictates that the interruption of prescription
running against a mineral servitude is accomplished through good
faith drilling,119 production,120 acknowledgment,121 or, in limited
circumstances, adoption of another party’s drilling operations on
the servitude-burdened tract in question.122 Therefore, the right to
unilaterally interrupt prescription running against a mineral
servitude by means other than drilling on the burdened tract is not
112. Id. at 954 (emphasis added) (quoting W. J. McAnelly, Jr., A Review of
Poolwide Unitization Under Act 441 of 1960, 15 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 3, 6
(1969)).
113. Id. at 953–54.
114. See, e.g., Alexander v. Holt, 116 So. 2d 532 (La. Ct. App. 1959).
115. Id. at 537 (“We therefore conclude that Holt’s voluntary action in
signing the unitization agreement, even with the subsequent approval of the
commissioner, was no more than a voluntary act upon his part and that he was,
therefore, powerless to extend his mineral servitude by such voluntary act.”).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 536 (“If the order . . . is not binding on those who did not sign the
conventional agreement, it is even the less binding upon nonsigning landowners
or those having reversionary interests in minerals. Attempts on the part of
mineral owners to perpetuate or to extend the lives of their mineral interests
have frequently been held ineffective.”).
118. See id.
119. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:29 (2000).
120. Id. § 31:36.
121. Id. § 31:54.
122. Id. §§ 31:44–52.
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vested in the servitude owner by law. As Alexander holds, the
servitude owner is not also vested with the right to enter into a
VUA and thereby interrupt prescription by good faith drilling or
production from an off-tract well without the granting of such
power expressly by the landowner.123 Although Alexander predates
the adoption of the Mineral Code, its reasoning is supported by
commentators.124
As one commentator stated, servitude owners “cannot unilaterally
decrease the use burden imposed by law as a prerequisite to the
maintenance of such interests.”125 Additionally, Professor Patrick
Ottinger made a worthy point when he inquired into the
consequences of holding that a servitude owner could unilaterally
interrupt prescription by entering into a VUA without landowner
consent: if all of the persons having an interest in production from a
unit well fail to agree to the unitization and this is held to be a valid
conventional unitization, how many interested parties must consent
to form a valid unit?126 In other words, if the universal consent
among affected parties is not required to affect third parties to the
VUA, then what amount of consent is too little?
Given the weight of statutory, jurisprudential, and scholarly
evidence to the point that a surface owner’s consent is necessary to
form a voluntary unit that affects his interests, the conclusion that
such consent is necessary must follow. Any other conclusion
would lead to unforeseen and unpredictable consequences.
Although this Comment supports clarification through codification
of the rule that surface owner consent is necessary for a voluntary
unit’s off-tract drilling to affect the surface owner’s tract, the
weight of authority on the subject and the lack of countervailing
evidence leads to the inescapable resolution that surface owner
consent to a voluntary unitization is necessary for the voluntary
unit to affect the surface owner’s tract.
II. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS AND THEIR EFFECTS
The surface tract that Kate co-owns may be a part of a
voluntary unit created by Black Gold with her fellow surface coowner, Mike, and the mineral servitude owner, Bob, but Kate
claims that her consent was necessary to include the tract within
123. Alexander, 116 So. 2d at 536.
124. See McCollam, supra note 15, at 775; Ottinger, The Mineral Servitude,
supra note 30, at 129.
125. McCollam, supra note 15, at 776.
126. Ottinger, The Mineral Servitude, supra note 30, at 129.
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the unit.127 Louisiana jurisprudence and legal scholarship strongly
indicate that all “affected parties” must consent to a voluntary unit
in order for their interests to be affected by the VUA.128
Additionally, a general co-ownership principle in Louisiana is that
a co-owner cannot encumber the interests of the co-owned thing
without consent from all of the co-owners.129 In other words, Mike
cannot put a contractually burdensome obligation on the entirety of
the co-owned thing without the consent of Kate because to do so
would certainly affect her ownership interest in “each molecule” of
the co-owned tract.130 Accordingly, the voluntary unit must not be
read to affect Kate’s rights as a co-owner of the burdened tract
because she did not consent to the unitization.
Difficulty arises, though, in finding a remedy for Kate once the
voluntary unit has been created, Bob and Mike have consented to
the VUA, and good faith drilling or production has occurred. As
Louisiana law currently stands, three remedial options are evident.
First, a court may adopt an all-or-nothing approach such that Mike
and Bob’s VUA fails to interrupt prescription accruing against
Bob’s servitude as to the entire tract because Kate’s consent was
not obtained. Second, a court may synthesize mineral coownership law and unitization theory to allow Mike’s majority
ownership to unilaterally burden both his and Kate’s interests in
the surface tract through the VUA. Third, a court may decide to
interrupt prescription of a portion of the servitude proportionally to
the ownership interests of Kate and Mike.
A. The “All-or-Nothing” Approach
The Mineral Code does not empower a servitude owner to
unilaterally contract for off-tract, good faith drilling or production
to interrupt prescription accruing against the servitude by means of
his or her unilateral consent to a VUA.131 Servitude prescription is
only interrupted by off-tract drilling in two situations: when the
servitude (in part or in whole) is included in a compulsory unit by
127. See supra Introduction.
128. See discussion supra Part I.E.
129. See discussion supra Part I.C.
130. See Denègre, supra note 65, at 611.
131. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:33 (2000) (declaring that rules of
interruption may only be made less burdensome expressly and in writing by
agreement between the parties and only by allowing unit operations to interrupt
for the whole servitude regardless of whether the whole servitude lies within the
unit area or the location of the unit well); Ottinger, The Mineral Servitude, supra
note 30, at 128–30; see also discussion supra Part I.E.
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dictate of the Commissioner of Conservation, or through inclusion
of the servitude (in part or in whole) in a declared unit through the
combination of pooling rights granted with a servitude or lease by
the landowner.132 Therefore, the voluntary unit must not be
interpreted to affect surface owners who neither consented to the
VUA nor granted to a burdening mineral servitude the ability to
unitize the mineral interest.133
The co-owner of a surface tract cannot bind fellow co-owners to
an encumbrance on their co-owned surface rights without universal
approval, except in limited circumstances.134 A co-owner may enter
into a valid contract, such as a mineral lease, with a third party with
regard to his share of a co-owned thing as the object, but such a
contract is ineffectual towards the interests of his fellow co-owners
in the co-owned thing until their consent is also obtained.135
Logically, the same rationale could apply to a VUA entered into by
a co-owner. When faced with facts similar to those presented in
Kate’s hypothetical situation, a court may conclude that a surface
co-owner can individually enter into a VUA but that off-tract
operations through the voluntary unit cannot interrupt prescription
accruing against a servitude until all surface co-owners consent to
the VUA.

132. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:33 (2000); Ottinger, Conventional
Unitization, supra note 9, at 27–41. Adoption of the operations of another to
interrupt prescription of the mineral right is not available in cases of off-tract
drilling as the servitude owner may “adopt” another’s good faith drilling or
production to interrupt prescription only when the drilling operations are on the
tract burdened by the servitude, unless the landowner provided otherwise when
creating the servitude. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:44 (2000) (“A mineral
servitude owner may adopt operations or production by a person other than
those designated by Article 42 if his servitude includes the right to conduct
operations of the kind involved.”).
133. See discussion supra Part I.E.
134. Those circumstances exist when landowners with 80% of the ownership
interest in a tract grant a lease or a mineral servitude. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
31:164, 166. See discussion supra Part I.C; see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
31:175 (2000) (stating co-owners of a mineral servitude may operate on the land
as long as 80% of the co-owners consent to the operation).
135. LA. CIV. CODE art. 805 (2012) (“A co-owner may freely lease, alienate,
or encumber his share of the thing held in indivision. The consent of all the coowners is required for the lease, alienation, or encumbrance of the entire thing
held in indivision.”). Unless the grantor of a mineral right has 80% coownership interest in the land or servitude tract, the servitude or lease granted
will not allow the grantee to drill on the tract until the co-owner(s) of at least
80% of the co-ownership interest consent(s). LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:164,
166, 175 (2000).
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This “all-or-nothing” approach protects Kate’s interests. Mike,
her fellow co-owner, could not encumber Kate’s interests without
her consent to the VUA, and Bob could not unilaterally decrease
the burden imposed on him by law and by the terms of his
servitude. Accordingly, Bob’s consent to the VUA would not
interrupt prescription accruing against his servitude without the
concurrence of all parties who would be “affected” by the
unitization, here both Mike and Kate. Prescription would continue
to accrue against Bob’s mineral servitude until an interruptive
event occurs or a suspensive condition is fulfilled.136
B. The Hybrid Solution
In the interest of preventing a potentially inequitable resolution
that deprives a majority surface co-owner, like Mike, from using
the land as he pleases, a Louisiana court may look to the Mineral
Code for an egalitarian solution. By using a hybrid approach, a
court could conclude that, if the ownership interest of the
consenting surface co-owners to a VUA is at least 80%,
prescription running against the servitude should be interrupted.137
Under the Mineral Code, a co-owner, or group of co-owners,
whose ownership interest is equal to or greater than 80% of the
total interests in co-owned land, may grant the right to drill on the
land through a lease or servitude without procuring the consent of
the remaining co-owners.138 To burden the interests of the nonconsenting co-owner(s), the operator must make “every effort to
contact such co-owners and, if contacted, [offer] to contract with
them on substantially the same basis that he has contracted with
another co-owner.”139 Additionally, the co-owner of the land who
does not consent is not liable for any costs of the drilling
operations except out of his share of production.140 The same rule
applies to co-owners of land who grant a mineral lease.141
A court may find an analogous argument to the Mineral Code’s
80% co-owner consent exceptions persuasive such that the ability
of co-owners to enter into voluntary units for the exploration and
136. See discussion supra Part I.B.
137. The conclusion is analogous to the Mineral Code articles that allow for
mineral leases and servitudes to be created with the consent of co-owners of the
land whose ownership interest in the land is 80% or more. See discussion supra
Part I.C.
138. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:164 (2000).
139. Id. § 31:164 (alteration in original).
140. Id.
141. Id. § 31:166.
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production of oil and gas would not be curtailed by a resistant or
missing minority interest owner. This solution may enable
minority co-owners to voice their opinions and convince other coowners to resist the unitization. But, in a situation like Kate’s, her
resistance would not be successful since there is only one other coowner who owns over 80%. Such efforts could only prevent
voluntary unitization of the co-owned tract if the resistant coowners own, in the aggregate, more than 20% of the co-owned
thing. This feature preserves, to some degree, the civilian concept
of ownership in indivision by maintaining some autonomy between
co-owners.142 However, this solution would also prevent a small
minority of co-owners from imposing their will on the majority.
This is an approach that would preserve the civilian emphasis on
co-owner sovereignty, but simultaneously employ a democratic,
majoritarian element that encourages the use of voluntary units to
efficiently develop oil and gas in complex ownership environments.
C. The Proportional Interruption Method
In the first two approaches, either Kate’s refusal to consent will
cause the failure of the unit to encompass any part of the servitude
tract or Mike’s consent to Black Gold’s unitization will result in
the complete inclusion of Bob’s servitude in the unit. However,
another solution offers an intermediate approach to these two
extreme results. The Mineral Code provides that valid compulsory
or conventional units with good faith drilling or production that
encompass some, but not all, of a tract burdened by a servitude will
cause interruption of prescription only for the portion of the
servitude within the unit.143 As a consequence, a court may view
operations conducted under a voluntary unit that is not fully
consented to as ineffectual against the interests of the nonconsenting co-owner, but a court may also find that the VUA
remains valid as to the consenting surface co-owner’s interests.
Such a finding could interrupt the running of prescription against
the servitude proportional to the consenting surface co-owners’
ownership interests.
The surface owner (full or co-owner) has incentives to enter
into the VUA with the servitude owner. The consent will likely be
142. See discussion supra Part I.C.
143. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:33, 37 (2000). The default rule regarding
the extent of interruption from an off-tract unit well may be modified by
contract, but must be agreed to expressly and in writing. See Ottinger, The
Mineral Servitude, supra note 30, at 126–28.
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given as a response to some consideration and, by allowing the
servitude owner to unitize his servitude, will diminish the
likelihood that the mineral servitude owner will drill on the surface
property.144 It will be up to the individual landowner or co-owner
to determine if those interests outweigh the potential reversion of
the mineral rights back to the surface property if the servitude
owner fails to drill on the property or a compulsory unit covering
the tract in question is not formed and drilled upon.145 The mineral
servitude owner has the incentive to enter into the VUA to extend
the life of at least a portion of the mineral servitude and share the
costs of drilling and production, avoiding the totality of the
enormous expense and risk involved with drilling personally.146
Without the consent of the surface owner, the servitude owner
cannot use a voluntary unit to interrupt prescription accruing
against his right and will be reluctant to enter into a voluntary unit
that prevents him from also drilling on his servitude.147
Accordingly, the operator has the incentive to pursue the surface
owner’s consent because, without that consent, a servitude owner
may not enter into the VUA. Under the proportional approach, all
parties would have incentives to use voluntary unitization to
quickly pool mineral rights and economically explore.
This solution would preserve the rights of a non-consenting coowner against a servitude owner trying to interrupt the running of
prescription against its servitude. It also prevents non-consenting
co-owners from inhibiting those co-owners who wish to enter into
the VUA and allows the mineral servitude holder to exploit its
mineral rights. Under this solution, any payments made in
consideration of signing the VUA and any production payments
from the unit operator to the consenting parties would not be
144. For a discussion of motivations for signing a unitization agreement, see
supra Introduction.
145. Drilling from compulsory units has the effect of interrupting
prescription running against those mineral interests that are encompassed within
the unit but outside the drilling tract. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:33, 37
(2000).
146. Non-unit wells will only affect those interests associated with the tract
that the well is drilled upon. For a discussion of incentives and considerations of
unitizations, see Ottinger, Conventional Unitization, supra note 9, at 24–26.
147. The effects upon a surface owner of a voluntary unit are limited to the
interruption of prescription accruing against burdening mineral rights and are the
rationale for requiring their consent before allowing these units to affect the
surface owner. See discussion supra Part I.E. There would not appear to be a
prohibition against a servitude owner entering into a unitization agreement in
which he participates in costs and shares in revenue but does not interrupt
prescription running against his mineral interest. Id.
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wasted. This remedy would respect all players and preserves the
ease and simplicity with which voluntary units should be formed.
D. Holes in the Three Solutions
A court faced with the difficulties posed by a minority surface
owner’s non-consent to a voluntary unit seems to be left to choose
between one of three solutions. One solution would find that the
voluntary unit had no effect upon the co-owned tract, another
would dictate total interruptive effect against prescription running
against the burdening servitude, and the last would divide the
servitude into prescribed and interrupted sections. However, each
solution faces challenges to its viability either because of its
inconsistency with existing law or due to the ancillary effects of its
application.
1. Problems with the “All-or-Nothing” Approach
The “all-or-nothing” approach, while preserving the civilian
rule that one co-owner cannot unilaterally burden a fellow coowner’s interest, would nullify the effects of the contractual
arrangement made between the consenting surface co-owner(s) and
servitude owner(s) to create the voluntary unit against any part of
the tract, payments made by the mineral lessee in exchange for
consent, revenue sharing between those believed to be in the
voluntary unit,148 and the distributions of drilling costs between the
consenting parties.149 Allowing the servitude to not be interrupted
by such an arrangement would curtail the ability of the servitude
owner to exploit its mineral rights because giving any surface coowner the power to impede unitization introduces a formidable
obstacle to entering into a VUA. This approach would also allow
any co-owner to infringe fellow surface co-owners’ freedom of
choice to engage in potentially lucrative oil and gas exploration.150
148. It is worth noting that if a non-consenting landowner or mineral right
owner knowingly accepts payments made in accordance with an agreement, the
accepting party may be held to have ratified that agreement. See La. Canal Co.
v. Heyd, 181 So. 439 (La. 1938) (holding a non-signatory party’s acceptance of
payments under the terms of a mineral lease served to bind the accepting party
to that lease).
149. Cost sharing, equitable production allocation, and the ease of voluntary
unit formation are the primary reasons that a lessee would seek to form a
voluntary unit. See supra Introduction.
150. The 80% rule was adopted by the Legislature in order to avoid this
result in other mineral law contexts. See discussion supra Part I.C.
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Additionally, this remedy may give operators less security in their
exploration activities involving co-owned lands, as any failure of
universal co-owner consent in the past may make significant
investment obsolete.151
Enabling non-consenting surface co-owners to prevent the coowned tract from entering a voluntary unitization gives the coowner who withholds consent an inordinate amount of leverage with
an oil and gas company. This is the very problem that the
Legislature sought to prevent when it amended the Mineral Code in
1986 and 1988 to allow for a significant majority of co-owners to
“out-vote” the non-consenting co-owners when authorizing
exploration activity on their own tract.152 Without such an exception
to the general rule of requiring full consent, co-owners may be
incentivized to withhold consent in order to procure the most
advantageous deal from the operators by being the last co-owner to
agree to the VUA. Allowing minority co-owners like Kate to
unilaterally inhibit a voluntary unit from affecting their tracts may
make the otherwise efficient method of pooling mineral interests by
VUA too cumbersome for widespread use by operators in
Louisiana.
2. Problems with the Hybrid Approach
The hybrid solution, analogizing to the 80% rule, gives rise to
two principal problems. First, non-consenting minority co-owners
would have their property rights taken without compensation.
Under the Mineral Code articles allowing for the 80% consent
exceptions, the non-consenting co-owners are entitled to revenue
generated by drilling through the agreement to which they did not
consent but by which they are affected as a result of the 80%
rule.153 Therefore, the non-consenting co-owners are not totally
without recovery for the encumbrance of their ownership interests
in the co-owned thing.154 However, if the 80% rule is applied to the
situation where a surface co-owner does not consent to a VUA,
there is no recovery for the non-consenting surface co-owner
whose ownership interest is not more than 20%. The surface co151. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Touchet, 86 So. 2d 50 (La. 1956)
(invalidating a declared unit when it attempted to include the interests of a
landowner who did not originally consent to the declared unit and, as a result,
there were no interruptive effects as to the prescription accruing against a
mineral interest burdening a non-drillsite tract allegedly in the unit area).
152. See discussion supra Part I.C; Crowder, supra note 64, at 944.
153. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:164, 166 (2000).
154. Crowder, supra note 64, at 945.
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owner does not hold the mineral rights when there exists a
servitude on the tract and is consequently excluded from revenue
from production. All consideration obtained by the consenting
surface co-owner functions like a bonus for signing the VUA. As
non-signatories, non-consenting surface co-owners are not entitled
to a payment made in compensation for cooperation as they are not
in privity to the private contract. This analogous solution would
deprive a non-consenting surface co-owner of property rights
without recovery.155
Second, this twist on existing exceptions is inconsistent with
civilian principles of interpretation. Civilian statutory interpretation
demands that when there is an exception to a general principle, the
exception should be read to apply strictly to the individual
circumstances it involves.156 The general rule from the Civil Code is
that co-owners must unanimously consent to an encumbrance on
their co-owned thing.157 To construct an analogical solution from
exceptions to that general rule would be inconsistent with civilian
methodology.
3. Problems with the Proportional Interruption Approach
Like the other two solutions, the proportional remedy has two
potential complications. First, when the prescription of nonuse
running against a servitude fully accrues, the proportional solution
leaves unanswered the question of how to divide the servitude
between prescribed and interrupted portions of the servitude.
Second, division of the servitude seems to run against the Mineral
Code’s clear statement that mineral servitudes are indivisible.158
In the case of a declared or compulsory unit encompassing a
part of the mineral servitude area but not the whole, the application
of the “partial interruption” rule is relatively simple.159 The unit
areas are clearly defined through either the lease giving the pooling
rights or the order of the Commissioner, but the clarity disappears
in the case of voluntary units—units left undefined in either the
155. The non-consenting surface co-owner may have a case for unjust
enrichment (enrichment without cause). See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2298 (2012). An
analysis of this potential remedy for the non-consenting co-owner is beyond the
scope of this Comment. However, an adoption of this 80% solution may lead to
further litigation between the parties.
156. See State ex rel. Murtagh v. Dep’t of City Civil Serv., 42 So. 2d 65, 73–
74 (La. 1949).
157. See discussion supra Part I.C.
158. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:62 (2000).
159. Ottinger, The Mineral Servitude, supra note 30, at 127–28.
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Mineral Code or post-Mineral Code jurisprudence.160 In the case of
voluntary units created without the full consent of burdened
surface co-owners, the coverage of the voluntary unit is less clear
due to the partial nature of the consent given to include the coowned land within the voluntary unit. In theory, whatever
ownership interest the co-owner had in the land is upon every
molecule of substance of the land.161 If the proportional
interruption remedy were used in the case of Kate and Mike’s
hypothetical tract, the time accruing against the servitude
burdening each molecule of the co-owned tract would be
interrupted for nine-tenths of each molecule (i.e., the proportional
share of Mike’s ownership) but would continue accruing for onetenth of every molecule (i.e., the proportional share of Kate’s
ownership).
In the event that a court holds that the entrance of a servitude
and partial surface interest into a voluntary unit would place that
tract partially within the unit area, the question of application
necessarily arises. Upon the conclusion of the ten-year prescriptive
period running against a portion of the servitude, the court must
then decide whether to divide the servitude geographically or to
simply interrupt prescription on the servitude proportionally to the
ownership interests of the consenting and non-consenting surface
co-owners. A court would likely choose the latter option. A
geographic division would create questions of how the division
would take place upon land and potentially cause more uncertainty,
litigation, and expense for the parties seeking resolution. The
division by area would potentially increase the burden on the
servitude owner by forcing the servitude owner to drill wells on
that newly divided portion of land in order to preserve his mineral
right by interrupting prescription.162
When the servitude partially prescribes, the court may avoid
these aforementioned difficulties by instead distributing to the nonconsenting surface co-owner a portion of the mineral interests
previously held by the servitude owner without geographic
division.163 The mineral interests of the mineral servitude owner
would simply be preserved in proportion to the consent obtained
160. Id.
161. See discussion supra Part I.C.
162. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:179 (2000).
163. Upon the occurrence of this solution, however, the servitude holder may
be placed in a situation requiring it to gain the approval of at least 80% of the
co-owners of the surface in order to drill on the tract, whereby placing the
servitude owner in a diminished situation that was not contracted for upon the
creation of the servitude.
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from the surface co-owners. The surface co-owner would hold a
percentage of a tract’s mineral rights proportional to the coowner’s ownership interest and would be free to lease the rights,
apply to unitize them, or seek a partition of the property into
geographically separate areas. Therefore, the remedy to the issue
on the mechanics of dividing the servitude partially prescribed by a
voluntary unit presents itself through a non-geographic solution.
However, a legal implication of the division of a mineral servitude
also presents a problem for the proportional approach.
The proportional solution appears to divide Bob’s servitude
when mineral servitudes, like predial servitudes,164 are indivisible.165
Mineral servitude indivisibility means, for instance, that in a case
where co-owned land is partitioned, a separately owned mineral
servitude that burdens the land of the co-owners is not divided
between the partitioned tracts.166 This general rule protects the
interests of third-party servitude owners so that preserving their
mineral rights does not become more onerous and complicated.167
A complication of dividing a mineral servitude may be that the
owner of what was formerly one servitude would be required to
drill multiple wells to prevent prescription of non-use accruing on
what is now several servitudes instead of just one.
164. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 652 (2012).
165. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:62 (2000). The mandate of servitude
indivisibility is essentially excepted in several situations. Pre-Mineral Code
jurisprudence suggested that when an existing servitude is granted in part to
another by geographic area, the servitude is not divided but the “advantages” of
the servitude could be divided. See McDougal, supra note 32, at 1119. This
means that the prescription accruing against one geographically subdivided
portion of the mineral servitude would not be interrupted through use of the
other subdivided portion. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:69 cmt. (2000); Ohio
Oil Co. v. Ferguson, 34 So. 2d 746 (La. 1947). Pre-Mineral Code jurisprudence
also suggested that when a servitude owner grants a portion of the servitude to
the owner of the surface and thereby make the remaining servitude noncontiguous, the servitude portions are divided by the resultant non-contiguous
tract. See Arent v. Hunter, 133 So. 157 (La. 1931); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:69
cmt. (2000).
166. Martin, supra note 36, at 443 (“Although the Louisiana mineral
servitude doctrine precludes the creation of a ‘mineral estate’ independent of full
title to the land, land subject to a mineral servitude may not be partitioned by
licitation with respect to the servitude because the landowners do not hold a
common element of ownership with the servitude owner.”). See Steele v.
Denning, 445 So. 2d 94 (La. Ct. App.), aff’d, 456 So. 2d 992 (La. 1984).
167. The rule regarding the indivisibility of the mineral servitude flows from
the indivisibility of predial servitudes. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:62 cmt.
(2000). The indivisibility of predial servitude is made out of concern for adverse
effects upon the dominant estate. LA. CIV. CODE art. 652 cmt. c (2012).
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The Mineral Code states that servitudes may be partially
prescribed by area when included in a conventional or compulsory
unit.168 The division of mineral servitudes seems to occur in cases
of partial unitization of a mineral servitude. When prescription is
interrupted for a portion of a mineral servitude inside a unit by
production from an off-tract producing unit well, the prescription
for the portion of the servitude outside the unit continues to
accrue.169 For practical purposes, the servitude would seem to be
divided upon the arrival of the full ten-year prescriptive period.170
One portion of the servitude would remain existent, but the mineral
rights previously held by the mineral servitude portion outside the
unit area would revert back to the landowner.171 Though the
“division” terminology is not used in the partial unitization
context, the rule against mineral servitude divisibility seems to be
functionally circumvented.
Since servitudes may be partially prescribed by area when
included in a conventional unit,172 this rule should apply with equal
force to voluntary units—a subset of conventional unitizations.173
Servitudes only partially included in voluntary units through a
failure of surface co-owner consent to the voluntary unit should
partially prescribe. The effects of partial unitization and partial
prescription through a voluntary unit are not distinguished from
partial unitization and partial prescription through a declared or
compulsory unitization.174 The exception to the prohibition against
mineral servitude indivisibility available for partial unitization
through conventional or compulsory units is not withheld from
situations involving voluntary units and should therefore apply in
these circumstances.
168. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:33 (2000). Mineral Code articles 34, 35,
and 37 state the same rule that partial inclusion of a mineral servitude in a unit
will cause prescription to be interrupted for only that portion of the mineral
servitude included in the unit. See id. §§ 31:34–35, 37.
169. Id. § 31:33.
170. See McDougal, supra note 32, at 1144. (“Article 33, which reflects preCode jurisprudence, provides that a good faith drilling of a well to the unitized
sand or sands on unit land not subject to the mineral servitude that turns out to
be a dry hole interrupts prescription of nonuse only for the portion of the lands
subject to the servitude included in the unit, not the entire servitude. Article 34
provides for the same division if the well is shut-in, and article 37, which
reflects prior jurisprudence, provides for the same result when the well comes in
as a producer.” (footnotes omitted)).
171. See discussion supra Part I.B.
172. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:33 (2000); id. §§ 31:34–35, 37.
173. See discussion supra Part II.C.
174. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:34–35, 37 (2000).
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III. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION: DEFINE VOLUNTARY UNITS AND
AFFIRM CO-OWNER SOVEREIGNTY
Co-ownership principles establish that a co-owner cannot
encumber a co-owned thing without the full consent of all coowners.175 A thorough reading of the jurisprudence surrounding
voluntary unitization leads to the conclusion that surface owner
consent to a voluntary unit is necessary for the unit to affect his or
her interests.176 These two findings may cause a court to adopt any
of the three approaches available under current law. However, the
“all-or-nothing” approach, holding that one co-owner may prevent
a voluntary unit from affecting the co-owned thing, produces a
harsh result for operators and mineral rights holders.177 This
approach would result in prescription continuing to accrue against
Bob’s servitude despite the drilling on the voluntary unit,
protecting non-consenting surface co-owner Kate’s interests. But it
would disregard the VUA between Mike, Bob, and the unit
operator, render pointless any compensation made to Mike and
Bob for entering the VUA, and force Bob to move away from the
quick and less expensive voluntary unit to more expensive options
to preserve his mineral rights (e.g., have a well drilled on his
servitude or seek a compulsory unit).
Alternatively, the hybrid solution would enable a significant
majority of the co-owners to overrule a small minority in order to
encourage the economical and unwasteful exploration of minerals
in the unit area. A court’s application of the hybrid solution would
result in non-consenting co-owners, like Kate, being left
potentially without economic recovery from an encumbrance of the
co-owned thing.178 This approach also interprets exceptions to the
general rule of universal co-owner consent broadly when civilian
methodology mandates they be read narrowly.179 Accordingly, a
codification of this result is not an ideal solution.
The proportional approach, on the other hand, is the most
equitable solution available and would also encourage the use of
VUAs as a means of economically exploring for oil and gas. This
175. LA. CIV. CODE art. 805 (2012). See discussion supra Part I.C.
176. See discussion supra Part I.E.
177. See discussion supra Part II.A.
178. Although applying the 80% consent exception to voluntary unitizations
and surface owners may result in non-consenting co-owners being offered
substantially the same deal as the consenting co-owner, non-consent would
deprive the non-consenting co-owner of property rights without compensation.
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 31:164, 166 (2000).
179. See discussion supra Part I.C.
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approach would allow surface co-owners to voluntarily consent to
their interests being a part of a VUA and would thus extend the
voluntary unit over the tract but only to the extent of the consenters’
interests.180 It would not affect the interests of non-consenting coowners who are not a party to the contract.181 However, it would not
give those non-consenting surface co-owners a heavily advantaged
bargaining position with an operator seeking to form a voluntary
unit, as the operator would not need all of the surface co-owners’
consent to form a unit over the area. The problems of the
proportional resolution can be avoided by division according to
ownership interest and not through an arbitrarily determined
geographic area,182 and by treatment of the servitude “division” as a
permissible and necessary function of partial unitization.183
The proportional approach should be adopted by the Louisiana
courts and its Legislature because the solution preserves the
ownership rights and interests of each party involved in the
unitization: land co-owners, mineral right holders, and mineral
lessees.184 The Mineral Code should clarify the way voluntary units
are formed, define their effects, and adopt the proportional solution
for when courts are confronted with a scenario similar to Mike and
Kate’s in order to avoid inequitable results amongst the various
parties and to promote the use of the voluntary unit as a relatively
speedy and inexpensive method to unitize mineral interests.
A. Voluntary Unitization and the Mineral Code
The Legislature should act to define the voluntary unit—
without clarity, the use of VUAs in Louisiana remains in a state of
uncertainty, an unattractive situation to would-be mineral lessees,
mineral right holders, and landowners. Additionally, the answer to
the question of whether the voluntary unit affects non-consenting
landowners may have significant effects upon the current
ownership of mineral rights across the state. Any voluntary unit
formed without the consent of every surface owner in its defined
area may have the mineral ownership which the operator believed
to have existed turned on its head simply because one or more
surface owners did not consent to the VUA.185 Mineral rights (e.g.,
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

See discussion supra Part II.C.
See discussion supra Part I.D.
See discussion supra Part II.D.3.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:33 (2000). See id. §§ 31:34–35, 37.
See discussion supra Parts II.C., II.D.3.
See discussion supra Part I.E.
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mineral servitudes) may prescribe because drilling activity from
the unit failed to interrupt prescription running against them since
the surface owners previously burdened by the mineral servitude
did not consent to any form of conventional unitization. At the
same time, surface owners must be included in the voluntary unit
formation process and must have that right codified; otherwise, the
powers of the servitude owner to interrupt its own prescription may
be greatly expanded beyond those expressly enumerated in the
Mineral Code.186
Accordingly, the Mineral Code should be amended to
recognize this right. Language should be added to Mineral Code
article 213(6)—the article, in current form, inadequately articulates
the unitization process—to explicitly recognize this right of surface
co-owners. The proposal below clarifies the law regarding
voluntary unit formation:
Unless otherwise provided by law, a voluntary unit is
formed through an agreement between consenting parties
and is ineffective against the interests of non-signatory
parties, including landowners burdened by mineral rights,
mineral right owners, and mineral lessees.187
This alteration would not change the effects of any provision in
the Mineral Code. However, it would serve to clarify that any
interests not brought into the VUA by contract would be
unaffected by the agreement, including the burdened surface
owner’s interests in the reversion of a mineral servitude back to the
landowner after the ten-year prescriptive period of nonuse fully
accrues. The use of the modifier “non-signatory” clearly expresses
the intention that the parties affected must be directly involved
with the contractual creation of the unit. This addition would only
186. Id.
187. The full text of the proposed Mineral Code article 213(6) would thus
read:
(6)(a) “Unit” means an area of land, deposit, or deposits of minerals,
stratum or strata, or pool or pools, or a part or parts thereof, as to which
parties with interests therein are bound to share minerals produced on a
specified basis and as to which those having the right to conduct
drilling or mining operations therein are bound to share investment and
operating costs on a specified basis. A unit may be formed by
convention or by order of an agency of the state or federal government
empowered to do so.
(b) Unless otherwise provided by law, a voluntary unit is formed
through an agreement between consenting parties and is ineffective
against the interests of non-signatory parties, including landowners
burdened by mineral rights, mineral right owners, and mineral lessees.
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alter the definition of conventional unitization as far as voluntary
units are concerned and would leave unaffected the wellestablished jurisprudential rules regarding the formation and effect
of declared units.188 Because of the rule that on-tract drilling
interrupts prescription accruing against a servitude, regardless of
whether the servitude is fully encompassed by the unit,189 the
statement “[u]nless otherwise provided by law” is necessary. This
statement ensures that the proposed paragraph does not conflict
with that rule regarding on-tract drilling. Consent of the landowner
to form a voluntary unit is unnecessary when the drill site is on the
surface tract, as the servitude owner had the legal capacity upon
the creation of the servitude to drill on the tract and thus interrupt
prescription running against the entire servitude.190
For a non-consenting surface co-owner like Kate, this provision
should make clear that her interests are protected against inclusion
in the VUA without her express consent. However, the provision
does not outline how her failure to consent would affect Bob’s
servitude, the interests of her fellow co-owner, Mike, or the
undertakings of Black Gold Drilling.
B. The Rights of Surface Co-Owners
Even with the voluntary unit defined by Mineral Code article
213, a court may interpret the provision such that neither Mike nor
Kate is affected by drilling upon the voluntary unit, even though
Mike signed the VUA.191 Or, Mike’s consent may be read to be
binding upon the tract through analogy to the 80% exception.192
Thus, the Legislature should amend the Mineral Code to further
clarify voluntary units’ effects on non-signatory surface co-owners.
The adoption of the language below to Mineral Code article 37—
the article addressing the extent to which production from a unit
well will affect tracts wholly and partially encompassed by the
unit—would effectuate that result:
A co-owner of land burdened by a mineral servitude may
contract for his interest in the land to be included in a
voluntary unit without the consent of the remaining co188. See Ottinger, Conventional Unitization, supra note 9, at 27–42. For
purposes of clarity, a definition of a declared unit in the Mineral Code should
also be included, but such a proposal is beyond the scope of this Comment.
189. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:37 (2000).
190. See id. §§ 31:21–23.
191. See discussion supra Part II.A.
192. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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owners. Such an act is ineffective as to the interests of nonsignatory co-owners. A voluntary unit is only effective to
interrupt prescription accruing against a separate mineral
right proportional to the interest(s) of the consenting
landowner(s) burdened by that right.193
This addition would preserve the traditional civilian rule of coowner sovereignty194 and allow a surface co-owner to gain
compensation for entering into a VUA. At the same time, it would
not affect the individual ownership interests of other co-owners in
the co-owned thing. The codification of the proportional approach
would not affect servitude owners’ rights to drill on burdened land,
lease their mineral right for drilling, seek a compulsory unit, or
enter into a conventional unit when their lease or servitude
agreement allows for unitization of their mineral right. This
solution only expands the servitude owner’s rights.
Such a provision would provide the servitude owner an
economical way to interrupt prescription on the mineral servitude,
in proportion to consenting surface co-owner consent, by drilling
through a voluntary unit’s off-tract well, a method that was not
previously available to the servitude owner.195 The proposed
change does so by giving the co-owners of the burdened land the
ability to extend the encumbrance as to their own unique
ownership interest in exchange for compensation. The extension
193. An appropriate location for this addition to the Mineral Code is in the
articles providing for a servitude to be partially interrupted by area. As a
provision that ultimately will allow for prescription to remain accruing for one
portion of a servitude and be interrupted for another, it is logically consistent
with articles in Chapter 4, Part 4, Subpart B, of the Mineral Code. The addition
of a second paragraph to article 37 would provide a natural flow from the
preceding five articles regarding unitized production partially interrupting a
servitude. The full text of the proposed Mineral Code article 37 would read:
(a) Production from a conventional or compulsory unit embracing all or
part of the tract burdened by a mineral servitude interrupts prescription,
but if the unit well is on land other than that burdened by the servitude,
the interruption extends only to that portion of the servitude tract
included in the unit.
(b) A co-owner of land burdened by a mineral servitude may contract
for his interest in the land to be included in a voluntary unit without the
consent of the remaining co-owners. Such an act is ineffective as to the
interests of non-signatory co-owners. A voluntary unit is only effective
to interrupt prescription accruing against a separate mineral right
proportional to the interest(s) of the consenting landowner(s) burdened
by that right.
194. See discussion supra Part I.C.
195. See discussion supra Part I.E.

508

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

then enables the mineral servitude owner to interrupt prescription
accruing against his servitude by drilling a well through a
voluntary unit, sharing costs and revenue between neighboring
mineral interests. This addition simultaneously empowers the
landowner and servitude owner in previously unavailable ways and
makes voluntary unitization a more predictable and attractive
option for oil and gas operators.
Under this modification, Kate, the hypothetical non-consenting
co-owner, has options in regards to using her newly acquired
mineral rights when Bob’s servitude partially prescribes. She
would be able to contract to be included in a voluntary unit, seek
the formation of a compulsory unit that would include her tract, or
seek a judicial partition of the co-owned land, as she is in full
ownership of all the rights associated with her share of the land. A
partition would enable the previously non-consenting co-owner,
Kate, to apply for a permit to drill upon her now solely-owned
partitioned tract.
Adopting the proposed amendments to the Mineral Code,
which would allow surface co-owners to individually enter into a
VUA and servitude owners to have their servitude interrupted by
partial co-owner consent, incentivizes the use of VUAs and
removes uncertainty surrounding how the voluntary unit affects a
non-consenting co-owner’s rights. These legislative solutions
could not only save millions of dollars in litigation over the effects
of voluntary units and in unnecessary royalty and bonus payments,
but could also make voluntary units a more attractive unitization
option for operators, mineral servitude holders, and landowners
alike.
CONCLUSION
The first amendment to the Mineral Code proposed by this
Comment will clarify the method of voluntary unit creation. This
proposal defines the extent of a voluntary unit’s effect by stating
that a voluntary unit is effective only as to the parties who
consented to the unitization agreement. The second proposal
clarifies the law so that proportional interruption of servitudes may
be accomplished through partial surface co-owner consent to a
unitization. By employing two clarifying amendments to the
Mineral Code, the Louisiana Legislature can avoid ambiguity in
the law and prevent inconsistent and inequitable results for
operators, lessees, surface owners, and mineral-right owners alike.
Through the amendments, surface co-owners will be prevented
from trampling on each other’s interests in the unitization context,
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taking a potential source of strife out of the co-ownership
environment.
The beneficial effects of the proportional interruption solution
are well illustrated by the hypothetical scenario posed by Mike and
Kate’s surface co-ownership, Bob’s mineral servitude, and Black
Gold’s voluntary unit. Kate and Mike have a difference of opinion.
Mike wishes to avoid the inconvenience and environmental and
aesthetic damage posed by oil and gas exploration on his land and
receive some consideration for the inclusion of his interest in the
voluntary unit. Additionally, Mike sees his resistance as futile
because he thinks Black Gold will simply seek a compulsory unit
if he does not consent. Kate, on the other hand, believes that there
will not be good faith drilling or production on the tract or through
a unit prior to the conclusion of the ten-year prescriptive period on
Bob’s servitude. Thus, she does not consent. Through the use of
the proportional approach, Mike’s consent to the voluntary unit
remains effective against the servitude burdening his co-ownership
interest, Kate’s minority ownership is unaffected, Bob’s servitude
may be partially preserved through unit drilling, and Black Gold
maintains a voluntary unit over the tract in proportion to Mike’s
ownership interest. The adoption of the proportional approach
through these amendments is the only way forward that protects
and enhances each involved party’s interests and encourages the
use of voluntary unitizations to efficiently explore for minerals in
Louisiana. Who knows? Maybe in the end it will be just a little
“more fun to share with everyone.”
W. Drew Burnham
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